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Abstract
Splitting a literal genomic sequence into 4 binary files is enough to ensure 
confidentiality and integrity during storage and transfer of information. 
The binary files are resources for RSA or one-time-pad (OTP) 
cryptography protocols.
It is speculated that representing nucleic bases as Bell’s states in a 
‘quantum’ view of a sequence would provide tools for genomic data 
protection when implemented in an authentic quantum computer, soon to 
come as a practical and readily available device.
Secure storage and distribution of data from sequencing genomes of 
bacteria, viruses and humans (with special emphasis on the latter for its 
significance in personal medicine) is a major issue.
Here it is shown how the genomic sequences can be safely encrypted and 
transferred and how tools developed for this purpose can be extended to 
the protection of any type of data. A venture into a ‘quantum’ view of a 
genomic sequence may provide formal means for safe genomic data 
protection in the future.
Security and integrity of genomic sequence storage
The level expected for security of the genomic information (or for any 
other data or items) results from a permanent trade-off between the value 
attributed to the object to be protected and the efforts and resources an 
attacker would engage to break confidentiality. Hence the subsequent 
protocols for data storage and transfer are occasional, not meant to provide
absolute protection but are likely to make it difficult for malicious actions 
to be successful.
1-a classic sequence
Nucleic acid sequences, as represented by strings of four letters, can be 
viewed as vector-like objects in a four-dimension space endowed with four
orthogonal basis vectors. The projection of the sequence onto one 
dimension can be expressed as a binary string. For example, projecting 
sequence –--AGTCAAG--- leads to a 4-row array, with yhe rows referred 
to as Bin(base).
A    –-1000110---       Bin(A)
T    –-0010000---       Bin(T)
G    –-0100001---      Bin(G)
C    –-0001000---      Bin(C)
When separately stored, the Bin(base) files offer safe protection of 
genomic data. Indeed, fraudulent access to one file makes it hardly 
possible to unveil the full nucleotide sequence since the number of 
combinations formed with the remaining three letters is 3N  for a N-base 
long DNA string. Even if two Bin(base) files have been hacked, the 
probability of recovering the genuine sequence remains as low as (2N)-1. 
Access to three files (1N possible remaining combination) is enough to 
retrieve the genuine nucleotide sequence, provided none of the binaries is 
corrupted.
In addition to confidentiality, the binary splitting allows to detect breaches 
in integrity if an attacker modifies the length or the compositions of the 
Bin(base). Indeed, all files should have same length and, only one digit ‘1’ 
should appear in each column in the 4xN array representing the sequence.
The splitting into binaries, the reconstruction of the literal sequences as 
well as the control of integrity is readily achieved using a simple algorithm
(a Python code has been develop to this respect).1
Straightforward conversion of the binary strings into numbers (binary, 
decimal, hexadecimal) readily provides numerical resources of interest for 
general purpose cryptography. For example, the third binary file necessary 
for reconstructing the genuine genomic sequence can be encrypted using 
the RSA algorithm with primes closest to numbers from the two other 
binary strings.
Another safe encryption tool is the one-time-pad algorithm (OTP). 
However, OTP is provably secure only if the message to be encrypted is 
Xored (exclusive OR logical operation) only once with an authentic 
random binary sequence. True random sequences cannot be provided by 
classical algorithms, deterministic in nature but the rapid development of 
quantum computers whose logic is based on the physical principles of 
quantum mechanics, is likely to provide genuine randomness. 
Nevertheless, an acceptable level of security can be reached using binary 
pads derived from a random access to the immense resources provided by 
genomic data banks (ftp://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genomes/refseq/bacteria/  ;
ftp //ftp.ensembl.org/pub/release99/fasta/homo_sapiens/dna/)
Patterns and regularities in genomic sequences, barring them as good 
candidates for OTP encryption, are tentatively detected from the Fourier 
transform (FT) of the binary files. In this respect, compact, intronless 
bacterial or viral genomes should be excluded as they present a remarkable
peak at frequency 1/3 in the Fourier spectrum, resulting from the repetition
of codons. This pattern is not observed in the human genome (where only 
2-3 % correspond to gene coding) nor are significant regularities in the low
frequency region of the spectrum. (Figure 1)
In the course of the import from the data bank, an attacker might gain 
knowledge of the genomic sequence and the chromosome it originates by 
‘blasting‘ the sequence against the whole data bank. Hence, splitting the 
sequence into its Bin(base) prior to transfer would insure enhanced 
security. Alternatively, safe transfer of a literal sequence might be 
achieved in a close future using quantum devices. Several platforms are 
readily accessible for simulating a quantum computer on a classical 
machine thus permitting the development of quantum algorithms in the 
meantime.2 (IBM’s Qiskit,  Microsoft’s Q#, Qutyp quantum toolbox in 
Python).
Figure 1: from upper left: Fourier Transform (FT) of Bin(A) of a random 
200kB-long bacterial sequence (here E.coli, K13_MG1655); Log plot; 
Fourier Transform of Bin(A) of a random 200kB-long human genome 
sequence (here Human chromosome 21,GRCh38); Log plot of c.
2-a ‘quantum’ sequence
In a ‘quantum’ genomic sequence, a given position is no longer occupied 
by a well-defined nucleotide but rather consists in a superposition of the 
four building bases. The ‘classical’ sequence would only materialized 
when observed and, in the process (the measurement), all contributions in 
the superposition would collapse, except that observed. Although real 
genomic sequences  are not quantum objects (nor is Schronfiger’s cat!), 
the ‘quantum’ approach would tentatively lead to a fresh view on a DNA 
sequence.
The Dirac formalism, the general tool to describe quantum states is 
adopted here. Conventionally, a state S is represented by a ‘ket’ vector, |S>
associated with a column matrix. The transpose of the ‘ket’ matrix is a row
matrix associated with the ‘bra’ vector <S|.3-4
Accordingly, the state at a given position on the sequence can be 
represented by the ket:
|ψ> =α|A> +β|T>+γ|G> +δ|C> (1) or,
|ψ> =α|0> +β|1>+γ|2> +δ|3> where numbers stand respectively for bases. 
The coefficients (Greek letters) are complex numbers. |ψ> will be referred 
to as a ququart (4 contributions in the representation)5.
The scalar product of |ψ> by itself (expressed as <ψ|ψ>) represents the 
probability of a position on the sequence to be occupied by any of the 4 
bases and should be equal to 1, consistently with the base vectors being 
orthogonal.
α2+ β2 +γ2 +δ2 =1
|ψ> can be represented as a column matrix whose elements are the 
coefficients in the base |0> ....|3>. Given equal probability for each base to 
occupy one position, the coefficients are likely to be equal to 1/2. The 
probabilistic nature of the coefficients will be further underlined and 
discussed.
In the course of this contribution column matrices will be represented as 
the transposes T of row matrices for sake of easier writing.
|ψ> = 1/2[1 1 1 1]T 
|0> =[1 0 0 0]T
|1> =[0 1 0 0]T
|2> =[0 0 1 0]T
|3> =[0 0 0 1]T
Although straightforward, the ququart representation suffers significant 
drawbacks. First, the information in |ψ> can only be retrieved upon 
measurement which would lead to statistical, information-poor results. For
instance the probability that |ψ> is in state |0> is measured by the square of
the scalar product <0|ψ> and is 1/4 as could have been anticipated. Would 
it be possible to create, starting from |ψ>, states which, when measured, 
would deliver a unique result? This might be achieved by applying to |ψ> 
various operations (represented by the actions of 4x4 square matrix 
operators) at the price formal complexity. Second, and most concerning, 
developing ququart-based algorithms and protocols may  be pointless 
given the formidable challenge of manufactoring stable, reliable and 
readily available concrete physical devices.
Alternatively, a ququart state can be represented as a combination of 2 
qubits. Qubits are formally easy to manipulate and an abundant literature is
devoted to their use in quantum protocols. Moreover, qubits have already 
materialized as concrete physical set-ups implemented into true quantum 
computers.
Qubit
A qubit is represented as the superposition of 2 elementary states:
|ψ> =α|0> +β|1>
α and β are complex numbers with α2 + β2 =1
In contrast to a classic view, α and β can take any values conventionally 
represented as points on the Bloch sphere (figure 2). This quantum 
indetermination makes qubits eligible as resources for true random 
numbers generators (see above discussion on OTP).
When coefficients α and β are expressed in terms of angles on the Bloch 
sphere (figure2, a qubit is written as: 
|ψ> = cos(θ/2)|0> +eiφ.sin(θ/2)|1>
Although undetermined, the most probable qubit would correspond to |0> 
and |1> equally contributing in the superposition (θ= 90°).
|ψ> = 1/√2 (|0> +|1>) if φ = 0
Figure 2: representation of a qubit on Bloch sphere.
Exchanging one ququart for 2 qubits 
In a quantum world, the space of a 2-qubit state is the tensor product of the
individual spaces. Consequently, the ket |ψ> associated to qubits |ψ1> and |
ψ2> would be expressed as the tensor product |ψ1>⊗|ψ2>.
The space of |ψ> has 4 dimensions and hence spans the same-dimension 
space as a ququart.
|ψ>=|ψ1>⊗|ψ2> = α1α 2|01>⊗|02>+α1 β2|01>⊗|12>+α2 β1|11>⊗|02> + β1 β2|
11>⊗|12>, or, omitting subscripts on basis vectors:
|ψ> = α1α 2|00> + α1 β2|01> + α2 β1|01> +β1 β2|11>
|ψ> =1/2 (|00> + |01> + |01> +|11>) with all α and β  = 1/√2.
|ψ> is represented as a column matrix:
|ψ> = 1/2[1 1 1 1]T 
The basis vectors of the space product are:
|00>=[1 0 0 0]T
|01>=[0 1 0 0]T
|10>=[0 0 1 0]T
|11>=[0 0 0 1]T
Since two classical bits (each with value 0 or 1) are necessary and 
sufficient to encode the nucleic bases (00 would be A, 01 T, …), |ψ> can 
be formally rewritten as:
|ψ> =1/2 (|A> + |T> + |G> + |C>)
Was the journey into the qubit representation useless as it ends up with the 
same |ψ> as ququart state (eq.1) suffering the same limitation arising from 
the statistical outcome of the measurement? Not quite. First, as will be 
seen below, it is now easy to construct states able to yield, when measured,
a single result. Moreover, from a practical viewpoint, manufacturing 
concrete physical qubits, although still demanding, is in rapid progress and
true qubit-based quantum computers are already operating.
From the 4 |ij> basis vectors, 4 special vectors, the so-called Bell’s states, 
not reducible to tensor products, can be readily built.3 
The Bell’s states
Quantum gates (matrix operators) used to construct the entangled Bell’s 
states correspond to rotations around the axes in the Bloch sphere. 
Quantum gates are unitary operators whose actions are reversible.4,7
The Hadamard gate (H), a single qubit operator, when applied to the basis 
vectors |0> and |1> of a qubit leads to:
H|0>= 1/√2 (|0> + |1>) = |ψ+>
H|1>= 1/√2 (|0> - |1>)| = |ψ->
The CNOT (cX) gate acting on a 2-qubit system flips the state of the 
second qubit only when the first qubit is in state |1>.
Hence, applying first H and then cX onto the basis vectors of |ψ> (|00>, |
01>, |10>, |11>) leads to the 4  Bell’s states.
For example:
H action on first qubit of |00>:
H|00>= 1/√2 (|0>+|1>) |0> = 1/√2 (|00>+|10> then cX acting on second 
qubit:
cX(H|00>)= 1/√2( |00> + |11|)= Bell00, represented by the column matrix :
[1/√2  0  0  1/√2]T
With 0-valued elements in its representative matrix, Bell00 is not a tensor 
product (where all matrix elements should be non-zero -see above-). The 
two qubits are entangled in state Bell00 .
H then cX applied to the other basis vectors lead to Bell’s states Bell01, 
Bell10, Bell11.
Alternatively Bell’s states can be derived from Bell00 applying Z, X gates.7
The 4 Bell’s states are:
Bell00 =1/√2( |00> + |11>) from H.cX acting on |00>
Bell01 =1/√2( |01> + |10>)                                   |01>                                    
Bell10 =1/√2( |00> - |11>)                                    |10>
Bell11 =1/√2( |01> - |10>)                                    |11>
Now if A wants to inform B that adenine (encoded as 00) is the base at a 
given position in the sequence, A will consider state |00>, transform it into 
Bell00 and send Bell00 to B. B will apply cX to the qubits and then H to the 
first bit (the reverse order was used to construct Bell00) and will retrieve 
state 00, corresponding to adenine, with probability equal to 1. Hence, B 
will unambiguously know that adenine is the base involved. Alternativey, 
transmission of the information can also be performed through the  
superdense coding procedure3 that, however, necessitates the intervention 
of a third party thus introducing complexity, unnecessary in the context of 
this presentation.
to th A full genomic sequence can progressively be transferred and stored. 
For example,
cX(Bell00) =1/√2( |00> +|10>)
Then H on first qubit :
1/√2(1/√2(|0> + |1>)|0> +1/√2(|0> - |1>)|0>) =
1/2 (|00>+ |10> +|00> -|10>) =|00>
Why could not A simply send the message ‘adenine ‘ or  A or 00  to  B  
instead of going through the tedious procedure of associating a Bell’s state 
to the base? A classical, non quantum message (like ‘adenine’, A or 00), 
can be intercepted by an attacker without B knowing it. If now the 
eavesdropper intercepts the quantum message, he can decode it, as B 
would, but  measurement will collapse the state and  B will know the 
message has been hacked. He can  also try to make a copy  of the message 
for further processing  but the no-cloning theorem3, 6 prevents any 
information to be gained from copying a quantum message and the efforts 
of the attacker remain useless.
In conclusion, the quantum approach appears appealing for secure data 
storage and exchange. However it is, so far, only a formal view that would 
become an efficient tool for handling genomic data only if implemented on
a true quantum computer. Even if ‘quantumized’ to some extent by 
introducing uncertainty into the coefficients, description of states such as 
ψ> or Bell’s would remain deterministic since randomness would originate
from pseudo random number generators.
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